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An Appreciative Model of Schumpeterian Evolution
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Abstract
Schumpeter persistently sought to reconcile innovation with general equilibrium to
explain economic evolution. In essence, he was interested in innovatory discontinuities
that upset equilibrium and generate a transitional dynamics converging to a different
state of technology. There are two central approaches to the analysis of economic
evolution which revolve around the Schumpeterian vision: the evolutionary approach as
originated in the landmark book by Nelson and Winter An Evolutionary Theory of
Economic Change and the neoclassical approach emerging from Romer’s seminal paper
“Endogenous Technological Change” Neither of these approaches is able to explain
economic evolution in an economy where both general equilibrium and innovatory
discontinuities can happen. In this paper I formalize the notion of innovatory
discontinuity using the concept of ‘ideas production function’ and present an
appreciative model of economic evolution involving equilibrium, innovation and
innovatory discontinuities. This (hybrid) model sheds some light on the answer to the
question: is economic evolution continuous or discontinuous?
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1. INTRODUCTION
It is generally agreed that the work of Joseph A. Schumpeter provided much of
the basis for the following axiom: to understand economic evolution it is necessary to
think carefully about business innovation. It is also generally agreed that the ultimate
end of the Schumpeterian vision of economic evolution is to understand fully the rules
that govern a creative economy. 1
Schumpeter persistently sought to reconcile innovation with general
equilibrium. In essence, he was interested in innovatory discontinuities that upset
equilibrium and generate a transitional dynamics converging to a different state of
technology. Apparently, the origin of this insight harks back to Leon Walras. In fact,
the following paragraph from Elements of Pure Economics suggests that it is not
unreasonable to conjecture that Schumpeter found inspiration in Walras:
Such is the continuous market, which is perpetually tending towards equilibrium
without ever actually attaining it, because the market has no other way of
approaching equilibrium except by groping, and, before the goal is reached, it
has to renew its efforts and start over again…Viewed in this way, the market is
like a lake agitated by the wind, where the water is incessantly seeking its level
without ever reaching it. But whereas there are days when the surface of a lake
is almost smooth, there never is a day when the effective demand for products
and services equal their effective supply and when the selling price of the
products equals the cost of the productive services used in making them…For
just as a lake is, at times, stirred to its very depths by a storm, so also the market
is sometimes thrown into violent confusion by crises, which are sudden and
general disturbances of equilibrium. Walras (1954, p. 380-381) [Italics in
original]
There are two central approaches to the analysis of economic evolution which
revolve around the Schumpeterian vision: the evolutionary approach as originated in the
book by Nelson and Winter (1982) and the neoclassical approach emerging from
Romer (1990b). Although these approaches discuss similar economic issues concerning
the creative economy, they see the innovation process with quite different lenses. It is
logically impossible to reconcile these approaches because the key assumptions in the
neoclassical approach are rejected by the evolutionary approach, and vice versa.
Moreover, neither of these approaches is able to explain economic evolution in a
creative economy where both general equilibrium and innovatory discontinuities can
happen.
In this paper I formalize the notion of innovatory discontinuity using the
concept of ‘ideas production function’ and present an appreciative model of economic
evolution involving equilibrium, innovation and innovatory discontinuities. This
(hybrid) model sheds some light on the answer to the question: is economic evolution
continuous or discontinuous?
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In this paper the term ‘creative economy’ means a market-guided economy where the increase in the
standard of living of its residents is primarily based on the production of profitable new ideas.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines
the conceptual framework of the mathematical models of a creative economy with
particular regard to the ideas production function. Section 3 formalizes the notion of
innovatory discontinuity. Section 4 brings into sharp focus the difference between
neoclassical and evolutionary theorizing. Section 5 presents an appreciative model of
Schumpeterian evolution. The paper ends in Section 6 with a brief summary and some
concluding comments.
2. IDEAS PRODUCTION FUNCTION
The centrality of technological innovation in economic growth has been clearly
recognized by many economists ranging from Smith (1776) to Abramovitz (1952) and
Solow (1956). However, it is only in the recent past that technological change has been
mathematically treated as an endogenous variable in a general equilibrium model
capturing important aspects of the Schumpeterian vision of economic change. This line
of research was initiated by Paul M. Romer -somewhat roughly in Romer (1990a)
(1990b)- and provoked an explosion of articles on innovation and economic growth.
Romer (1990b) developed the first general equilibrium model of a creative
economy (henceforth Romer model). The basic concepts in Romer's conceptual
framework are 'profitable new idea' exhibiting two attributes (non-rivalry and at least
partial excludability) and ‘human capital’ with the properties of a private good. Ideas
with economic value and human capital are the driving force of the creative economy.
These two concepts are related to each other through an ideas production function
involving two explanatory variables (the number of researchers and the stock of ideas
available to these 'ideas workers') and a single dependent variable, defined as the rate of
new ideas creation.
Insights
The most important achievement of the Romer model is the integration of the
following five insights into a coherent conceptual framework:
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪

Schumpeter’s insight (New ideas): The act of innovation consists of
reconfiguring old ideas in new ways to produce new ideas. Schumpeter (1934,
p. 68)
Schmookler’s insight (Profit motive and new ideas): Innovation is essentially an
economic phenomenon, or at least explicable in economic terms. Schmookler
(1966, p. 208)
Nelson’s insight (Proprietary aspects of new ideas): The act of human
innovation is typically imperfectly appropriable. Nelson (1982, p. 467)
Romer’s insight a (Ideas and Increasing returns): The existence of intangible
inputs renders increasing returns inevitable. Romer (1990a, p. 97)
Romer’s insight b (Ideas and Human Capital): Ideas and human capital are
inherently different economic products. Romer (1990b, pp. S74-S75).
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General equilibrium growth models revolving around these insights are called
Schumpeterian growth models. 2
Romer’s model also indicates that innovations only occur in the ideas-producing
sector completely described by the ideas production function. There is a one-to-one
correspondence between innovations and profitable new ideas. Innovations are largely
stimulated by the profit motive (Schmookler’s insight) and the corresponding new ideas
are at least partially excludable due to the existence of intellectual property rights
(Nelson’s insight). Consequently, private investment in innovation occurs in an
imperfectly competitive environment.
The logic of the existence of increasing returns (Romer’s insight a) is as
follows. A new idea is non-rival in the sense that its use in one activity does not prevent
its use elsewhere. Moreover, any new idea needs only to be created once, so that an
innovation only entails fixed costs, given by the one-time costs of creating the idea.
Consequently, a creative economy displays increasing returns to scale. 3
Definition
It is a basic premise of the Schumpeterian growth models that the ideas
production function reflects the innovation process in a creative economy. The general
expression of the ideas production function (briefly, IPF) can be written as the
differential equation
 (t) = F(LA, A )],
A

(1)

 (t) represents the rate of new ideas creation at time t, and LA and A denote,
where A
respectively, the number of researchers and the stock of ideas. Romer (1990b) was the
first economist to make the ideas production function explicit and concrete.
A pictorial description of the IPF can be presented as the source-target picture
shown in Fig.1. The IPF turns out to be a mapping from a point in a two-dimensional
space into a point in a one-dimensional space: in correspondence with each ordered pair
 (t).
[LA(t), A(t) ] there is one and only one instantaneous rate of new ideas creation A
This function, while a valuable analytical device, remains silent about the varieties and
complexities inherent to the innovation process. In this regard, the IPF is a black box.

2

These models constitute the core of what Richard Nelson calls the ‘new formal neoclassical growth
theories.’ Nelson (1994, p. 319). It is for this reason that in the present paper the expressions
‘Schumpeterian growth models’ and ‘neoclassical approach’ are used interchangeably.
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Intuitively, an increase of 1% in all inputs results in an increase in output by more than 1% because, by
definition, non-rival inputs can be used over and over again simultaneously by many people.
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An immediate implication of the existence of the IPF should be emphasized.
The specification of the right hand side of (1) would allow us to obtain a function A(t)
that reconstructs the past and predicts the future number of ideas in the creative
economy. Indeed, a particular solution to the differential equation (1) would give a
whole function A(t) describing the state of knowledge at any particular time t. 4 It is
assumed that this function condenses or summarizes the existing state of technology.
One basic question immediately suggests itself. Can we dispose of the concept
of an ideas production function and still have a formal Schumpeterian model? The short
answer is no because the elimination of the IPF would imply a return to the Solow
(1956) model. Consequently, the strategic assumption in the neoclassical approach to
economic evolution is the existence of the IPF.
The IPF revolves around three tacit assumptions. First, all innovations are
equally important for economic growth (e.g. the economic impact of a new satellite
technology is indistinguishable from that of a new can opener). Second, all innovations
occur in one sector only (the ideas-producing sector). Last but not least, there are no
innovatory discontinuities. These assumptions will be referred to as (1) equipollent
innovation, (2) confined innovation, and (3) unruffled innovation, respectively. 5
4

Given the number of ideas workers, that is, once the form of the function LA(t) is specified, a
differential equation like (1) usually has a general solution that depends on one constant that can be
uniquely determined. For example, assuming that the stock of ideas is historically known at the initial
time t = 0, say A(0) = A0, the particular solution of equation (1) can be determined.

5

Clearly, assumptions (1) and (2) are at odds with the empirical evidence. This is not intended to be a
criticism of the type “This equation is so simplistic, and the real world of innovation is so complicated.” I
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Disaggregation
The correlation between new ideas and their economic impact is not perfect.
The importance of distinguishing innovations in terms of the magnitude of their
economic impact goes back to Kuznets (1929). He formulated an innovation law that
can be condensed as follows: the introduction of a major technological innovation in a
given sector leads to a phase of rapid sectoral growth and gradually generates a set of
forces leading to a deceleration in the rate of growth of the sector in question. 6
As Pavitt (1984) has shown, sectors differ in important innovation aspects. His
classificatory scheme emphasized innovation linkages between sectors and that
technological change occurs differently across industries. One way of dealing with
innovation linkages consists of separating ‘enabling sectors’ and ‘recipient sectors.’ An
economic sector is said to be enabling if the innovations originated in that sector are
efficiency-enhancing in the same sector or in other sectors. The sectors receiving the
beneficial innovation flows are called recipient sectors. We have introduced these
concepts elsewhere to design an innovation-based typology of economic sectors. Pol et
al. (2002). As will become apparent in a moment, the notions of enabling and recipient
sectors are also useful to relax assumptions (1) and (2).
A glance at Fig.1 shows that the formulation of the innovation process implied
by the IPF is extremely condensed, not including many important aspects such as
possible distinctions between ‘big’ ideas and ‘small’ ideas, sectoral patterns of
innovation, etc. The relaxation of the assumptions of equipollent innovation and
confined innovation requires that we enter the black box of the IPF and design a
stylized scheme of innovation production to capture the following three facts: (a)
innovations differ in terms of their economic impact; (b) innovation occurs differently
across sectors; and (c) there are enabling and recipient sectors.
Consider two ideas-producing sectors, Sector 1 (enabling sector) and Sector 2
(recipient sector). At any time t the state of technology A(t) is decomposed into ideas
generated in the enabling sector A1 plus ideas originated in the recipient sector A2
A(t) = A1(t) + A2(t)

(2)

Assuming that new ideas emerging from the enabling sector have a multiplier effect in
the recipient sector, but the new ideas created in the recipient sector do not have a
perceptible influence on the generation of new ideas in Sector 1, the ideas production
functions for Sectors 1 and 2 can be written, respectively, as
 1(t) = F1[L1 (t),A 1(t)]
A

(3)

 2(t) = F2[L2(t), A1(t), A 2(t)],
A

(4)

believe that there is nothing wrong in assuming the existence of an IPF, provided that the limitations of
using such a concept are realized.
6

Some 40 years after the formulation of the law of retardation of sectoral growth, Kuznets wrote an
illuminating paper on the impact of major innovations (Kuznets, 1972). For a detailed analysis of the
Kuznets law on innovation, see (Pol and Carroll, 2004).
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where L1(t) and L2(t) denote the amount of labour allocated to producing ideas in
Sectors 1 and 2, respectively. For lack of a better expression we call the system of
differential equations (3)-(4) together with the identity (2) the innovation regime.
The preceding formalization of the innovation regime has the advantage of
mathematical simplicity.7 However, the interaction between enabling and recipient
sectors may be more complicated than the foregoing analytical representation. For
example, recipient sectors may feedback into the enabling sector and shape future
innovation in the latter. As will become apparent, the appreciative model developed in
the following sections does not depend on this restrictive formalization.
3. MEGA-INVENTIONS AND INNOVATORY DISCONTINUITIES
Mega-inventions are those inventions that constitute a platform for future
inventions and imply major technological shocks for the entire economy or that
significantly contribute to changes in its performance. Mega-inventions always induce
mini-inventions, that is, subsequent individually small inventions that help to make the
mega-inventions operational or small inventions that are conducive to gradual
improvements in the technology already in use. For example, we can say that the megainvention of the xerography occurred in 1938, but required lots of subsequent
improvements (mini-inventions) before the era of photocopying began in 1959.
The term ‘mega-invention’ is related but not identical with the concept of
‘macroinvention’ introduced by Joel Mokyr in The Level of Riches:
(…) I define microinventions as the small, incremental steps that improve,
adapt, and streamline existing techniques already in use, reducing costs,
improving form and function, increasing durability, and reducing energy and
raw material requirements. Macroinventions, on the other hand, are those
inventions in which a radical new idea, without clear precedent, emerges more
or less ab nihilo. In terms of sheer numbers, microinventions are far more
frequent and account for most gains in productivity. Macroinventions, however,
are equally crucial in technological history. Mokyr (1990, p.13) [Italics in
original]
The occurrence of a macroinvention does not necessarily have a noticeable effect on the
economy. For example, ballooning is considered as one of the greatest macroinventions
of all times but it is not a mega-invention because its economic impact was negligible.
In Mokyr’s own words: “Ballooning must be regarded as one of the most radical new
ideas of all times, yet its direct impact on economic welfare was small.” Mokyr (1990,
p. 294)
From the viewpoint of economic evolution, what matters is the concept of
mega-invention: a big invention is not ‘big’ merely by virtue of its intellectual novelty.
It has to have significant economic impact. Typically, mega-inventions are technologies
7

Specifically, it is possible to solve the system in two steps. First, we solve equation (3) for A 1(t), and
then, we obtain A 2(t) from equation (4). The addition of these two functions provides an explicit
specification of the state of technology A(t). It can be easily shown that with this choice for A(t) all the
results in the Romer model remain intact.
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that could not have evolved through incremental improvements in existing technologies
that they challenged in regard to some particular use. For example, electricity could not
have evolved out of steam. Less frequently, mega-inventions are radical new insights
emerging more or less without a clear precedent as in the cases of X-rays, penicillin and
radio astronomy. 8
The emphasis on ‘innovatory discontinuities’ harks back to Schumpeter himself.
He was quite explicit about the discontinuous nature of mega-inventions, although he
did not use the term mega-invention in his writings. Schumpeter articulated the view
that long cycles are caused by innovation. 9 His analysis in Business Cycles was
intended to apply only to innovations of a kind that implied a significant shift of the
state of technology. In Schumpeter’s own words,
(…) We shall impose a restriction on our concept of innovation and
henceforth understand by an innovation a change in some production
function which is of the first and not of the second or a still higher order
of magnitude. A number of the propositions which will be read in this
book are true only of innovation in this restricted sense.Schumpeter
(1939, p. 94) [Italics in original]
One of the distinguishing features of an innovation is that it can always be
understood ex post, but it can never be fully understood ex ante applying the ordinary
rules of inference to the existing facts. Innovation is by definition an uncertain
phenomenon. However, for analytical purposes the difference between a megainvention and a mini-invention is that mega-inventions are shrouded in Knightian
uncertainty (sensu stricto uncertainty) while mini-inventions are susceptible of
calculable uncertainty (risk in Knight's sense). This approximation is in line with the
history of technological innovation. Mokyr (1990, esp. p. 295).
In the Schumpeterian growth models, the state of technology A(t) presupposes
that all mega-inventions have already occurred and that technological change consists
of a continuous sequence of minor innovations, including mini-inventions. By
definition, a mega-invention (e.g. the invention of the electricity) substantially alters the
prevailing state of technology, and thereby provokes a change in the current innovation
regime.
After a mega-invention has occurred the new innovation regime can be
mathematically described as follows
 1(t) = G1[L1(t), B1(t)]
B

(5)

 2(t) = G 2[L2(t), B1(t), B2(t)],
B

(6)

8

The concept of ‘mega-invention’ is also similar to the notion of general-purpose technologies. For a
detailed explanation of the concept of ‘general purpose technology’, see (Lipsey et al., 1998, pp. 14-54).
This paper (implicitly) explains the difference between a macroinvention and a general purpose
technology.
9

Kondratiev’s ideas about the existence of long cycles or long waves of economic growth were brought
to the attention of the English-speaking economists through Schumpeter’s treatise Business Cycles.
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where the state of technology is now
B(t) = B1(t) + B2(t)

(7)

In brief, when a mega-invention occurs the state of technology changes from A(t) to
B(t).
Mega-inventions can be thought of as random innovation shocks affecting the
whole creative economy. An innovation shock entails a discontinuity in the following
sense: the state of technology changes from B(t) to A(t). Specifically, an innovatory
discontinuity is said to occur when a mega-invention provokes a selective replacement
of the state of technology. An innovatory discontinuity is not necessarily a ‘jump’
discontinuity but rather, and perhaps more typically, a gradual change from one state of
technology to another.
The empirical intuition behind the notion of innovatory discontinuity can be
illustrated by using the examples of the electricity and IT eras. Electrification arrived in
the 1890s (the start-up of the electricity era is often taken as the construction of the first
hydro-electric facility at Niagara Falls in 1894) and from the viewpoint of technology
adoption attained a plateau in 1929. The IT era started in 1971 when Intel’s invention of
the key component of the personal computer occurred (namely, the “4004 computer
chip”) and still underway.

4. NEOCLASSICAL VERSUS EVOLUTIONARY THEORIZING
Few economists would deny that the very notion of ‘evolution’ is sometimes
vague and at other times imprecise. For example, sometimes the term is associated with
the Darwinian theory of natural selection and at other times the word is used in
opposition to ‘revolution.’ As emphasized by Hodgson (1993, p. 38): “Nothing is more
guaranteed to generate confusion and stultify intellectual progress than to raise such a
muddled term [evolution] to the centrepiece of economic research, while
simultaneously suggesting that a clear and well-defined approach to scientific enquiry is
implied. The term can be used to describe a varied group of approaches in economics,
perhaps in contrast to the exclusive focus on equilibrium in neoclassical theory, but it
does not indicate a well-defined type of analysis. (…)”
Notwithstanding, there are notorious exceptions to the alluded lack of
terminological discipline. Schumpeter, for example, gave a clear definition of the term
‘evolution’. For Schumpeter (1954, p. 435) evolution means a process characterized by
incessant and irreversible change. Furthermore, the defining characteristic of
evolutionary analysis in any field consists of making evolution “the pivot of one’s
thought and the guiding principle of one’s method.” Schumpeter (1954, p. 436). The
striking implication of this definition is that the new generation of formal models of a
creative economy (including the Romer model) falls into the category of evolutionary
analysis.
What is distinctive about the so-called evolutionary theorizing is the following
two postulates: (a) a creative economy involves disequilibrium in a fundamental way;
and (b) both the occurrence and development of mega-inventions are inherently
uncertain. Specific interests and approaches shared by evolutionary economists include
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sympathy with the inductive method; emphasis that history matters, and the role of
government. This broad characterization of evolutionary theorizing can consistently
accommodate the wave of evolutionary models that started in the 1980s with the work
of Nelson and Winter (1982).
According to evolutionary scholars, the new generation of formal growth
models represents a desirable convergence of formal theory with appreciative theory.
They combine important aspects of reality (such as innovation, imperfect competition,
proprietary aspects of technology, and increasing returns to scale) within a general
equilibrium framework. Nelson (1994, p. 309). However, evolutionary theorists believe
that the neoclassical formulation emerging from the Romer model is inconsistent with
the Schumpeterian argument that a creative economy had to be understood as a process
inextricably linked to disequilibrium. Specifically, the evolutionary approach entails the
throwing away of both the equilibrium and optimizing notions that constitute the
unifying threads of the new neoclassical growth models. More specifically, this
approach emphasizes uncertainty in the Knightian sense and focuses on the nature of
routines that guide the behaviour of firms and how better routines get created and
spread. Nelson and Winter (2002, esp. pp. 39-40).
If technological change is path dependent (somewhat roughly, an evolutionary
process taking place under uncertainty in the strict sense) one implication is that it is
virtually impossible to predict technological developments. In particular, the production
of new ideas seems to depend on the random history of the creative economy. There
can be no well-defined ideas production function.
Although the central focus of both neoclassical and evolutionary theorizing is
economic evolution, these approaches concentrate on two different meanings of the
word ‘evolution.’ Indeed, while the Schumpeterian growth models indicate that
economic growth and technological change are predictable and continuous,
evolutionary theorizing stresses the unpredictability of economic evolution due to trial
and error, learning by doing, nature of the process. Or, to put it differently, neoclassical
and evolutionary theorizing constitute antagonistic approaches. It should be
emphasized, however, that both approaches are mute regarding innovatory
discontinuities.
5. APPRECIATIVE MODEL
Schumpeter’s conceptual grasp yielded the central concepts for the analysis of
economic evolution: innovation, entrepreneurship and creative destruction. Both
approaches (evolutionary and neoclassical) are extensions of Schumpeter’s insights.
Neither of them can capture his scientific desire of constructing a theoretical system
involving both equilibrium and innovatory discontinuities.
The extended analytical framework developed in Section 3 and 4 can be used to
build an appreciative model of the Schumpeterian vision of economic evolution. If we
assume that the creative economy is operating with the state of technology represented
by the function A(t) and that a mega-invention occurs at a particular point in time t*,
then how does the creative economy move from one state of technology to another?
There is no obvious answer. The propagation mechanisms are difficult, if not
impossible to decipher ex ante because technologies never move in a predictable
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fashion. For example, formerly unconnected technologies (such as lasers and fibre
optics) may turn out to be complementary.
After the occurrence of a mega-invention there is a transitional dynamics
converging to the new state of technology B(t). There exists an interval (not just a
point) of discontinuity t** - t* where the transition from the old to the new state of
technology takes place. What is involved in this transitional dynamics is an extensive
process of technological cross-pollination, redesign, modification, and innumerable
small improvements occurring after the introduction of a mega-invention. This means
that the convergence to the new state of technology B(t) will take a lengthy period of
time (technologies move slowly from the first mega-invention) and the transitional
dynamics is, at least in part, intrinsically intractable.
Figure 2 is an appreciative model of economic evolution as envisaged by
Schumpeter: the creative economy evolves gradually for long periods of time until one
or more mega-inventions provoke an innovatory discontinuity.

This figure also highlights the intuition behind the antagonistic approaches. The
neoclassical approach assumes gradual predictable evolution as represented by the
states of technology A(t) or B(t). The Schumpeterian growth models concentrate on
evolution in the first sense and ignore the transitional dynamics. Evolutionary theorists
tend to focus on stochastic evolution characterized by Knightian uncertainty and
disequilibrium conditions. For them the transitional dynamics is essential.
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In economics, we are prone to having superstar-figures. In the analysis of
economic evolution, Schumpeter continues to reign as the undisputed superstar. Like
other (non-mathematical) pioneers, Schumpeter did not write with the utmost precision.
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The lack of clarity in Schumpeter’s writings is most conspicuous in the field of
economic evolution associated with innovatory discontinuities.
The past twenty five years have been marked by a number of important
developments in the analysis of a creative economy. Schumpeterian growth models
have articulated five insights in a general equilibrium context emerging from
optimizing behaviour, namely: that innovation has a recombinant nature, that
innovation is pursued for gain, that new ideas are at least partially excludable, that
innovation generates increasing returns to scale, and that ideas and human capital are
products with different economic attributes.
In the simplified world of the Schumpeterian growth models technological
innovations come from an ideas-producing sector which operates according to the ideas
production function. Furthermore, technological change is viewed as a cumulation of
small, individually minor innovations. The assumption that there exists an ideas
production function is the sine qua non of the Schumpeterian growth models. Although
the analytical meaning of such a production function is simple and clear, troublesome
questions arise when one wants to introduce the notion of innovation heterogeneity into
these formal models.
In their evolutionary alternative to the neoclassical approach Nelson and Winter
(1982) represent technology as routines followed within firms. Most (if not all)
evolutionary economists object the existence of an ideas production function on the
basis that it is simplistic and the real world is much more complicated. Surely, the rate
of new ideas creation depends on factors such as culture, social capital and the nature of
the innovation environment.
It is generally recognized that the neoclassical and the evolutionary approaches
to the study of economic evolution are irreconcilable. In the context of the
Schumpeterian growth models evolution means gradual predictable change devoid of
discontinuities. For the evolutionary theorists, the word evolution refers to the
unfolding of a fundamentally unknown future where there is change based on mutation
and selection.
Evolutionary scholars believe that the economics profession will ultimately be
driven to adopt their non-equilibrium approach, if economists attach high priority to
characterizing and modelling unforeseen economic change induced by technological
shocks. Mainstream economists seem to believe that the style of modelling used by the
neoclassical economists is appropriate because the equilibrium concept is flexible
enough to encompass a time path along which the salient variables change in a
predictable manner (moving equilibrium). Recent generations of neoclassical growth
theorists reject the representation of technology as routines.
The Schumpeterian view has significant influence on contemporary thinking.
The antagonistic approaches tend to represent what economists thought Schumpeter
meant. Faced with the choice between neoclassical and evolutionary theory, what
should we do? There is no generally accepted answer to this question. The appreciative
model of Schumpeterian evolution suggests that to capture the Schumpeterian view one
has to use the ‘parallelogram law’ (see Fig.3). The antagonist approaches can be
thought of as the sides of a parallelogram and the Schumpeterian view is the diagonal of
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the parallelogram (or ‘sum’ of the parallelogram sides). Fig.3 also suggests that one
need not choose one extreme or the other.

A large proportion of the total growth in productivity takes the form of minor
innovations, including mini-inventions. However, there have been large and spectacular
changes in technology leading to economically significant changes as illustrated by the
electricity and IT eras. Thus, the empirical evidence appears to support the view that
there can be non-incremental technological changes and technological shocks to the
economy. The concept of innovatory discontinuity it is intended to these events.
Scientists have debating for a long time whether the past demonstrates that
change is gradual or not. In economics, this debate was originated by two great
thinkers, Marshall and Schumpeter. Alfred Marshall and Joseph Alois Schumpeter were
(and still are) extremely influential economists. Both of them were quite explicit in the
answers they gave. Marshall argued that economic evolution does not make leaps.
Schumpeter argued that, at least from time to time, economic evolution does make
leaps. The appreciative model is biased toward Schumpeter.
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